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ABSTRACT: The paper addresses the question of whether developing countries possess 
any built-in mechanism that can cope with external terms-of-trade (TOT) shocks. Using a 
two-sector, full-employment general equilibrium model with endogenous labor market 
distortion theoretically it shows that such countries possess an inherent shock-absorbing 
mechanism that stems from their peculiar institutional characteristics and can lessen the 
gravity of detrimental welfare consequence of exogenous TOT movements. This result 
has been found to be empirically valid based on a panel dataset of 13 countries from 
2000-2012. Our analyses lead to recommendation of an important policy that should be 
adhered to preserve this in-built system.   
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External Terms-of-Trade and Labor Market Imperfections in 
Developing Countries: Theory and Evidence 
 
 
1.  Introduction and motivation 
 
In the literature on trade and development, a very large numbers of empirical studies have 
pointed out that developing countries are much more vulnerable to external terms-of-
trade (TOT) shocks vis-à-vis the developed nations. These fluctuations are undesirable 
because they contribute to significantly increased volatility in the growth of output and 
hence social welfare. Studies e.g. Baxter and Kouparitsas (2006), Broda (2004), Mendoza 
(1995) and Kose (2002) have found that TOT fluctuations are twice as large in 
developing countries as in developed nations. According to them the nature of 
composition of export baskets, high degree of trade openness and very little influence 
over international commodity prices have been the main responsible factors.  
 
For minimizing the adverse effects of unfavorable TOT movements studies like Hoffmann 
(2007), Tornell and Velasco (2000), Broda (2004), Broda and Tille (2003), Mendoza (1995) and 
Kose (2002), Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) and Haddad et al. (2011) have suggested 
policies e.g. switching from fixed to flexible exchange rate regime and export 
diversification. Unfortunately, nowhere it has been pointed out that these economies have 
an in-built shock-absorbing mechanism that crops up due to their typical institutional 
characteristics and emphasized the necessity for adhering to development policies that do 
not impinge on this natural mechanism. In this study without undermining the efficacy of 
other suggested measures, we have demonstrated by using a 2×2 full-employment model 
for a small open economy with endogenous labor market distortion how the existence of 
labor market imperfection can minimize the severity of the detrimental TOT shocks. 
Analytically, our analysis also demonstrates that policies aimed at deregulating the labor 
market hurt the efficacy of small economies’ inherent shock-absorbing capacity.  
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Then, we have conducted a quantitative assessment of the theoretical result based on an 
annual panel dataset of 13 small developing countries over the recent time period of 
2000-2012. In terms of economic growth, this empirical analysis finds that developing 
nations with higher intersectoral wage differential have been less affected during the 
liberalized regime vis-à-vis some other developing countries with relatively lower wage 
dispersion. More specifically, we have established that TOT movements in either 
direction have caused smaller fluctuations in per capita GDP growth in the economies 
with larger wage dispersion vis-à-vis the other group of countries in the post-reform 
period. Quite a large number of empirical studies involving consequences of TOT 
changes on the developing economies are available in the literature on trade and 
development. However, there has been virtually no work that relates welfare outcomes of 
external price movements to labor market institutions of the southern countries and builds 
up a formal theoretical structure with empirical validation. Here lies the importance of 
this study. 
 
2.  The theoretical analysis and results 
 
We consider a 2×2 full-employment model with labor market imperfection in sector 2 for 
a small open economy. In sector 2 (a formal sector) workers receive the endogenously 
determined unionized wage, *W , while their counterparts in sector 1 (an informal sector) 
receive the competitive wage, W . There is perfect mobility of capital between the two 
sectors and its economy-wide return is r . All other standard assumptions of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model continue to hold. Sectors 1 and 2 are the 
export and import-competing sectors, respectively. Commodity prices, iP s are given by 
the small open economy assumption. Factor endowments are also exogenously given. 
Finally, commodity 1 is taken to be the numeraire. 
 
The unionized wage is determined as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the 
representative firm and the representative labor union in the unionized formal sector 
(sector 2) industry. Assuming homogenous firms and labor unions in sector 2 we here 
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directly borrow the simple unionized wage function as derived in detail in Chaudhuri and 
Mukhopadyay (2009) which is as follows. 
2* *( , , )W W P W U= ; with 
2
* * *( ), ( ), ( ) 0W W W
U W P
∂ ∂ ∂
>
∂ ∂ ∂
    (1) 
In equation (1) the parameter, U denotes the bargaining strength of the labor union in 
each formal sector firm.1 Besides, *( ) 0
*
W WEW W W
∂
= >
∂
; 2
2
*( ) 0
*
PWEP P W
∂
= >
∂
; and,
*( ) 0
*
W UEU U W
∂
= >
∂
 denote the elasticities of *(.)W with respect to 2,W P andU , 
respectively; and, ( ) 1W PE E+ = .O2 
  
The equations of the general equilibrium structure of the economy are as follows.  
1 1 1L KWa ra+ =          (2) 
2 2 2 2*( , , ) L KW P W U a ra P+ =         (3) 
1 1 2 2K Ka X a X K+ =          (4) 
1 1 2 2L La X a X L+ =          (5) 
where jia  is the amount of the j th factor required to produce one unit of output of sector
i for ,j L K= ; and, 1, 2i = . Equations (2) and (3) are the two competitive zero-profit 
conditions for the two sectors while equations (4) and (5) are the two full-employment 
conditions for capital and labor, respectively. Determination of factor prices and output 
levels are well-known. 
                                                 
1
 One of the most important objectives of the labor unions is to bargain with their 
respective employers so as to set the unionized wage, *W  as much higher as possible 
above their reservation wage i.e. the informal sector wage,W . The higher their 
bargaining power,U the larger would be the intersectoral wage differential. However, U  
is amenable to policy measures. If the government undertakes different labor market 
regulatory measures e.g. partial or complete ban on resorting to strikes by the trade 
unions, reformation of employment security laws to curb union power, U takes a lower 
value. 
 
2
 See Chaudhuri and Mukhopadyay (2009) in this context. 
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It is assumed that sector 1 is more (less) labor-intensive (capital-intensive) than sector 2 
in value sense i.e. 1 2
1 2
*L L
K K
Wa W a
a a
> . As *W W>  it automatically follows that sector 1 is 
more (less) labor-intensive (capital-intensive) than sector 2 in physical sense.  
 
The demand side of the model is represented as follows.  
 
Let V  denote social welfare that depends on the consumption of two commodities, 
denoted 1D  and 2D . The strictly quasi-concave social welfare function is depicted by 
1 2( , )V V D D=                   (6) 
 
The balance of trade equilibrium requires that 
1 2 2 1 2 2D P D X P X+ = +  (7) 
                                       
The volume of import of commodity 2, denoted M is given by the following. 
2 2 2( , )
              (-)(+)
M D P Y X= −
           (8)         
In equation (8), Y denotes national income at domestic/international prices and is given 
by 
1 2 2Y X P X= +  (9)                                                                   
 
2.1   Theoretical results -- consequences of deterioration in TOT  
 
Deterioration in TOT in the existing structure means an increase in the relative 
international price of commodity 2 i.e. 2P .  
 
Totally, differentiating equations (1) – (5), the following proposition can be easily 
proved. 
Proposition 1: Deterioration in the TOT leads to: (i) a decrease in the competitive wage,
W ; (ii) an increase in the return to capital, r ; (iii) an ambiguous effect on the unionized 
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wage, *W ; (iv) decreases in wage-rental ratios, ( / )W r and ( * / )W r ; (v) an increase in 
intersectoral wage differential,
 
( * )W W− ; (v) an expansion (a contraction) of sector 2 
(sector 1); and, (vi) an increase in employment of labor in sector 2, 2 2 2( )LL a X= .  
 
We verbally explain proposition 1 as follows. As 2P  rises a Stolper-Samuelson effect takes 
place that lowers W and raises r as sector 2 (sector 1) is capital-intensive (labor-
intensive). *W  gets affected due to two reasons. An increase in 2P  produces a direct 
positive effect on *W (∵ 0PE > ) while the decrease in W produces an induced negative 
effect (∵ 0WE > ). The net effect on *W is, however, ambiguous. It depends on the 
magnitudes of different technological, institutional, and trade-related parameters. 
Nevertheless, even if the net effect on *W is negative it would be less severe than that on 
W due to the presence of the additional direct positive effect on the former. 
Consequently, the ( * )W W− gap widens. However, it can be easily shown that the 
( * / )W r ratio surely decreases.3 Consequently, producers in both the sectors substitute 
capital by labor that raises the labor-output ratios, 1La and 2La and lowers capital-output 
ratios, 1Ka  and 2Ka . A Rybczynski type effect takes place leading to a contraction (an 
expansion) of sector 1 (sector 2).4 As sector 2 expands, the aggregate employment of 
labor in this sector, 2 2 2( )LL a X=  also increases.        
 
We now investigate the welfare consequence of the TOT changes. Differentiating 
equations (1) – (9) the following expression can be derived.5  
                                                 
3
 Mathematical proofs are quite straightforward. 
4
 It is needless to point out that a Stolper-Samuelson effect is followed by a Rybczynski type effect 
if technologies of production are of variable-coefficient type. 
5
 Interested readers can check these from proofs of similar results available in Chaudhuri and 
Mukhopadhyay (2014). 
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2
1 2 2
1( ) ( * )( )
                        (+)     (+)     (+)
dLdV W W M
V dP dP
= − −
         (10) 
 
From equation (10) the following proposition readily follows. 
Proposition 2: The presence of labor market imperfection, reflected in intersectoral wage 
differential, can soften the blow of an exogenous TOT shock on welfare. 
 
Proposition 2 can intuitively be explained in the following fashion. In the existing set-up 
an exogenous TOT shock can affect social welfare in two ways. First, as the relative price 
of the import good rises, the import-competing sector (sector 2) expands following a 
Rybczynski type effect at the cost of the export sector (sector 1). As the high wage-paying 
sector (sector 2) now absorbs more workers than previously the aggregate wage income 
rises. This we call the labor reallocation effect (LRE), which produces a positive effect 
on welfare. On the contrary, welfare deteriorates because the economy has now to pay 
more for importing a certain amount of commodity 2 from the international market 
whose relative price has increased. This may be termed as the value of import effect 
(VIE). The magnitudes of LRE and VIE are captured by the first and second terms of the 
right-hand-side of equation (10), respectively. Therefore, we find that social welfare 
improves due to positive LRE and worsens due to negative VIE. So, even if the positive 
LRE cannot outweigh the negative effect of VIE, it definitely neutralizes at least a part of 
the aggregate detrimental outcome of the latter effect on social welfare.  
 
The degree of labor market distortion which is reflected in the magnitude of intersectoral 
wage differential, ( *W W− ) depends positively on the bargaining power of the labor 
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unions,U . From (10) we note that the higher (lower) the value ofU  the larger (smaller) 
would be the intersectoral wage differential and so would be the strength of the LRE. 
Now, labor market reform which means lowering, U  weakens the strength of this 
beneficial effect on welfare. Thus, this policy would make the economy more vulnerable 
to unfavorable TOT movements at the international market. In the extreme case, when 
there is no labor market distortion we have *W W= . Consequently, there would be no 
positive LRE. In this situation, the consequence of adverse TOT movements at the 
international market on national welfare would completely be felt by the economy. The 
final proposition of the theoretical analysis is now imminent. 
Proposition 3: Labor market reforms aimed at lowering the trade union bargaining 
power make the economy more susceptible to unfavorable exogenous TOT movements. 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
 
In this section we conduct an empirical analysis based on an annual panel dataset of 13 
small developing countries over the recent time period of 2000-2012 to substantiate our 
main theoretical finding that the countries with higher wage dispersion are less prone to 
exogenous TOT changes compared to those countries with lower wage dispersion 
(proposition 2). Here countries are selected on the basis of ‘earnings dispersion among 
employees (decile 9 versus decile 1)’ data availability from ILOSTAT database from 
International Labor Organization (ILO) website.6 We consider this earnings dispersion as 
                                                 
6
In ILOSTAT database this variable is defined as “This measure of earnings dispersion refers to 
the ratio of average earnings of employees in the ninth decile to those of employees in the first 
decile of the earnings”. There are 38 countries for which this variable is available and following 
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a proxy for wage dispersion which varies greatly among countries as it is evident from 
the following figure.   
 
 
Based on median of these average earnings dispersion we create two groups of countries. 
Higher wage dispersion countries are Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia while lower wage dispersion countries are Brazil, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, India, Turkey, and Venezuela. Now, a panel data analysis is conducted to 
empirically measure the effect of external TOT changes on the per-capita GDP growth 
(pcgdp) while controlling for openness (OPEN) as a measure of percentage of export and 
import over GDP.  This empirical analysis utilizes the following basic formulation 
itititit uOPENTOTpcgdp +++= 321 βββ        (11) 
                                                                                                                                                 
our theoretical model’s foundation we did not consider those countries which are in the high 
income (both OECD and non-OECD) groups and countries for which data either for pcgdp, or 
TOT, or OPEN are not available from 2000 to 2012. 
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where i = 1, 2,…, 7 for higher wage dispersion countries and i = 1, 2,…, 6 for lower wage 
dispersion countries  and t = 1, 2, . . . ,13  and 	
 . The left-hand side is the 
annual percentage growth rate of GDP per-capita which is obtained from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Development Report (WDR) for different years. 
Note that instead of calculating pcgdp we have rather collected such series directly from 
the WDR database. The right-hand side involves annual percentage growth rates of TOT 
and OPEN.  Before estimating this equation we have checked stationary aspect of each 
series and found that each of these series is highly stationary in terms of the well-known 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test.7 
 
At the beginning, equation (11) is estimated with ordinary least squares on pooled time-
series cross-section data. Thereafter, we have considered a fixed effect (FE) model (11a) 
by adding dummy for each country so that we are able to estimate the pure effect of the 
explanatory variables on the pcgdp by controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity.   
itititiit uOPENTOTpcgdp +++= 321 βββ
      
 (11a) 
   
Each dummy ( is absorbing the time-invariant effects particular to each country, if 
any.  Since our group of countries is diverse we have a reason to believe that differences 
across countries might have some influence on the RER, therefore, we have proceeded by 
considering a random effect model (11b). 
itiititit ueOPENTOTpcgdp ++++= 321 βββ
      
(11b) 
                                                 
7
 For the sake of brevity we have not reported these results explicitly. 
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where  is a random error term with a mean value of zero and variance of .       
 
Both fixed-effect (FE) and random-effect (RE) panel data regression models pass the 
standard F test for overall significance at the 1% level. Since we have used the time-
series cross-section data for different countries, the residuals might have suffered from 
the heteroskedasticity problem and hence are adjusted by providing t-value based on 
heteroskedasticity corrected robust estimation method. The impact of TOT on the pcgdp 
is largely consistent with our theoretical model. The estimated  coefficient  of  the  TOT  
in  the  pcgdp  equation  is  positive  and  statistically significant for FE and RE panel 
data models whereas, the control variable OPEN is not statistically significant for the 
group of countries with lower wage dispersion (see Table 2). On the other hand, for the 
group of countries with higher wage dispersion (see Table 1) although the estimated 
coefficient of the TOT in the pcgdp is positive it is not statistically significant in all the 
three panel data models.  However, one thing should be noted that the signs of the 
estimated parameters for the coefficient of TOT are remarkably consistent and intuitively 
correct in all the underlying models. 
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[Insert Table 1 is about here] 
Table 1: Panel data analysis with countries having higher wage dispersions 
Variables 
OLS 
(Pooled) 
FE RE 
TOT 0.019 
(0.60)a 
0.007 
(0.23) 
0.013 
(0.46) 
OPEN 0.071** 
(2.12) 
0.091* 
(2.42) 
0.082** 
(2.10) 
Constant 2.866*** 
(11.28) 
2.877*** 
(32.87) 
2.872*** 
(8.21) 
    
a t-value (corresponding to robust standard error) in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level. 
 
[Insert Table 2 is about here] 
Table 2: Panel data analysis with countries having lower wage dispersions 
Variables 
OLS 
(Pooled) 
FE RE 
TOT 0.079 
(1.47)a 
0.120** 
(4.17)a 
0.102*** 
(4.61) 
OPEN -0.011 
(0.23) 
-0.028 
(0.84) 
-0.022 
(0.75) 
Constant 2.745*** 
(6.10) 
2.705*** 
(45.58) 
2.723*** 
(3.81) 
    
a t-value (corresponding to robust standard error) in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level. 
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To check the robustness of the above findings, we have also considered this analysis 
without considering the control variable OPEN. Results relating to higher wage 
dispersion countries are reported in Table 3 whereas the estimates corresponding to lower 
wage dispersion countries are reported in Table 4. These results also support our 
analytical finding that countries with higher wage dispersion are relatively less affected 
by TOT fluctuations of recent years compared to those countries with lower wage 
dispersion. 
[Insert Table 3 is about here] 
Table 3: Panel data analysis with countries having higher wage dispersions 
Variables 
OLS 
(Pooled) 
FE RE 
TOT 0.055 
(1.85)a 
0.054 
(1.90) 
0.054** 
(2.18) 
Constant 2.838*** 
(10.64) 
2.842*** 
(33.82) 
2.840*** 
(9.04) 
    
a t-value (corresponding to robust standard error) in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level. 
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[Insert Table 4 is about here] 
Table 4: Panel data analysis with countries having lower wage dispersions 
Variables 
OLS 
(Pooled) 
FE RE 
TOT 0.077 
(1.43)a 
0.115** 
(5.55)a 
0.097*** 
(5.10) 
Constant 2.719*** 
(6.02) 
2.639*** 
(60.34) 
2.677*** 
(3.72) 
    
a t-value (corresponding to robust standard error) in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
To decide between the FE and RE for the appropriate model particular to our dataset we 
have conducted well-known Hausman test where the null hypothesis considers that the 
preferred model is the RE model and have found that we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
Thereafter, we have proceeded by conducting the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for the 
panel effect with the null hypothesis that the variance across countries is zero. The result 
indicates that we fail to accept the null hypothesis which in turn substantiates our 
empirical analysis with panel data instead of considering separate OLS regression for 
each country. Moreover, in view of the short time span and assumed parameter 
homogeneity, following Baltagi et al. (2009), we can conclude that the panel results 
should be more reliable vis-a-vis pooled OLS results (given in the first column in each of 
the above tables), which we have exactly done here. 
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This result suggests that, on average, a 1% increase in TOT across time and between 
countries with lower wage dispersion caused about 0.1% overall increase in the pcgdp 
whereas countries with higher wage dispersion had experienced either no (see Table 1) 
or lower (almost half) impact (0.05%, see Table 3) of TOT changes on the pcgdp. Hence, 
our findings are as follows: the effect of TOT changes on pcgdp growth had been 
typically small in absolute terms but consistently significant relative only to the 
developing countries with lower wage dispersion. These results provide systematic 
econometric evidence to support the hypothesis that the TOT changes had significant 
impact on economic growth in the countries with lower wage dispersion but negligible 
impact on growth in higher wage dispersion countries during the period, 2000-2012.  
 
4. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
 
Some recent empirical studies have found that developing countries are more prone to 
external terms-of-trade shocks compared to developed nations. Policies like switching 
from fixed to flexible exchange rate regime and diversification of the export basket have 
been advocated in general to minimize the negative effects resulting from such 
international disturbances. However, possibly no attempt has been made to identify the 
inherent shock-absorbing mechanism in the developing countries which arises out of their 
typical institutional characteristics. In this study, we have demonstrated how the 
existence of labor market imperfection can lessen the gravity of detrimental TOT shocks 
on social welfare. Moreover, by examining cross-country data we substantiate our 
findings that countries with relatively higher intersectoral wage differential have 
experienced smaller fluctuations in per capita GDP owing to TOT changes during the 
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period 2000-2012 relative to the other set of countries with smaller wage dispersion. We 
are of the opinion that the developing countries should not go for labor market reforms 
because these would impair the effectiveness of their internal shock-absorbing capacity 
against adverse international price movements. 
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